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lican character of our Constitution, we should see this neo-Kantian 
proposition not as the underlying principle of our Constitution, but 
(to borrow from Justice Black) an "incongruous excrescence" on it. 
A third area that scholarship needs to address is the authority 
of the Constitution. For its original claim to authority, the Consti-
tution itself tells us that ratification by conventions in nine states is 
sufficient. What is the political philosophy that can explain how 
that act can provide authority then or now for the Constitution? 
The answer to this question would help shed light on the meaning 
of the more controversial portions of the Constitution. But the en-
deavors to address it are woefully inadequate. Some would empha-
size a theory of actual consent, and thus favor the "original intent" 
of those writing and ratifying the document; but they fail to con-
sider how the founding generation extends its authority to future 
generations. Others would emphasize tacit consent; but they fail to 
consider the implication for constitutional interpretation. With the 
theory of tacit consent, the Constitution becomes whatever you can 
get away with saying it is; the only limits are those of imagination 
and manipulative rhetoric. Abandoning hope of finding meaning in 
actual or tacit consent, the Law and Economics school looks to 
maximization of social wealth, but forgets the importance of the 
individual, while the neo-Kantians, purporting to remember the in-
dividual, forget what it is that makes him or her human. And find-
ing no authority in any of this, Critical Legal Studies looks for a 
poetic voice tore-enchant the Constitution, unmindful of the nihil-
istic premises of its position.22 Obviously, a bit more thought to the 
authority of the Constitution would be helpful. 
JAMES MAGEE23 
In a judicial era that symbolically, if not actually, commences 
with Brown v. Board some students of law and politics have seen a 
drastic transformation of the role of courts in America. The change 
is apparent in what Owen Fiss has described as "institutional suits" 
and in what Abram Chayes welcomed in a widely cited essay as 
"public law litigation." In the 1970s some erstwhile advocates of 
judicial activism frightfully warned against the "imperial judiciary" 
that seemed increasingly and arrogantly to assault democracy with 
nearly absolute and unaccountable discretionary power. 
Judges have become "managers" and "overseers" of complex 
and extensive governmental operations commonly wielding equity 
22. See, e.g., f. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL sec. 211 (W. Kaufman trans. 
1966). 
23. Professor of Political Science. University of Delaware. 
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powers that used to be invoked only in "extraordinary" situations. 
In an award-winning book Donald L. Horowitz argued that courts 
were institutionally incompetent to handle these new and non-judi-
cial assignments. 
Courts, as political creatures, undoubtedly are adjusting to and 
reflecting the success of legitimate demands now being made by pre-
viously inactive or ignored elements of the political system. These 
demands often are converted into sweeping but not always specific 
national legislation which courts, sometimes by default, must imple-
ment. The demands also have been obviously fulfilled through new 
aspirations found among the many folds of the American Constitu-
tion, which judges must match against the realities of contemporary 
American life. In the midst of these accelerating changes in the 
judicial process, we still hear from high ground the totally unrealis-
tic plea for "strict construction" and federal judges "who don't 
make the law; they just interpret it." 
Are we really witnessing a fundamental abuse of the judiciary? 
If such a change has occurred, is it frequent and widespread enough 
to justify a conclusion that the judicial process itself has undergone 
drastic modifications? And if so, are judges less capable than other 
governmental officials in the difficult process of delivering the 
promises of rights and privileges that have found their way into 
American law? If there has been a profound change in the process, 
are judges themselves responsible for that change? 
Much of the disgruntlement about the new role of judges stems 
from opposition to the general libertarian direction of "institutional 
suits" and "public law litigation." Some of it, too, derives from the 
unsettling recognition that law is not the body of rules that law 
professors used to teach in law schools; with the intellectual threat 
of the Critical Legal Studies movement, this uneasy feeling intensi-
fies and breeds negative reactions to the assertedly novel uses and 
alleged abuses of the judicial power. 
If basic changes are working their way through the judicial 
process itself, are they simply consequences of a natural judicial 
evolution that parallels perhaps profound changes in American 
law? I sense that most of the writings critical of the new role that 
some courts have assumed are rooted in the ideological conserva-
tism of the critics. Their reactions seem to be sporadic reactions to 
large-scale equitable remedies and based on a notion that the judi-
cial process itself, unlike that of the other political institutions, is 
fixed. 
